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One of the things that is most often repeated about the US and UK response to the 2007-08 financial crisis is that nobody went to jail for 
the frauds and financial crises associated with the crash. Whilst there have 
been some limited prosecutions of middle ranking managers and individual 
traders, the people who knowingly developed and sold new forms of 
worthless derivatives – those bankers and traders that actively created the 
huge toxic debt – have been largely exonerated. President Obama and his 
officials argued that although ‘greed and other moral lapses were evident 
in the run-up to the crisis, their conduct was not necessarily illegal’.1  This 
is not quite true. As a number of commentators have argued, there was 
more than enough evidence of illegal practice to ensure that at least some 
at the top went down.2 After all, critics of this apparent paralysis in US 
and European criminal justice systems point out, Iceland managed to set an 
example by jailing twenty-six of its top banking executives.3
Some banks have been forced to pay large-scale settlements with the US 
Department of Justice for their sales of financial products in the run-up to 
the financial crisis. In May 2018, the total imposed on the Royal Bank of 
Scotland (RBS) for those offences rose to over $10 billion.  This came on the 
back of similarly large fines levied on US and European banks.4 Despite the 
burden of the fines, each of the major banks has ‘been aggressively returning 
money to shareholders through stock buybacks and dividends’.  The fines 
are effectively dwarfed by the value of the bailout to those banks. Those 
North American, British and mainland European banks were, as the cliché 
goes, ‘too big to fail’.5 
Although we tend to argue for ‘more punishment’ in response to white 
collar and corporate offending, the form that regulation takes in capitalist 
societies almost always guarantees impunity to the property owning class. 
As this essay will argue, the impunity guaranteed to the most powerful 
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executives following the 2008 crash, when considered alongside the fines 
levied against the banks and financial institutions, reveals a set of tensions 
and contradictions in regulation that are normal in capitalist societies: they 
do not merely apply to the biggest banks, and they do not merely apply in 
times of acute crisis.
The purpose of all forms of regulation in capitalist states is to maintain 
the steady rate and function of the machinery of industry and commerce. As 
such, its purpose is to seek a stable and uninterrupted system of production, 
distribution and consumption. Its primary purpose is not to punish or to 
seek justice for wrongs that have been done. Of course, occasionally some 
powerful individuals and institutions may be punished, but the extent to 
which this occurs can never be allowed to seriously disrupt regimes of profit 
accumulation. Iceland is a good example. The response of the Icelandic state 
to the 2008 crash has enabled the economy to stabilize and grow at a rate 
that is not matched anywhere else.6
Therein lies a core contradiction: when regulation (and punishment) is 
effective, it has the effect of stabilizing the system. When regulation is most 
effective, it enhances the longevity of capitalism as a system. Yet as socialists, 
we know that this is not in the interests of everyone. When we demand 
effective regulation, and when we demand justice for a criminal ruling class 
in such moments, we are also demanding that capitalism corrects itself. This 
is why demanding punishment of corporations, or of their executives, as a 
panacea to such crises or to the problems caused by capitalism can only ever 
be a strategy of limited or modest reform. 
This essay will explore how we can demand justice in ways that both seek 
to ameliorate the deadly harms produced by capitalism in the short term, but 
at the same time weaken capitalism as a system in the long run. The purpose 
of this essay, therefore, is to think how our demands for the punishment 
of corporate crime are targeted in ways that might usefully contribute to a 
transformative strategy.
THE DOUBLE MOVEMENT OF REGULATION
Marxist scholars have always been clear that the purpose of regulation is 
to ensure the reproduction of value.7 In the most basic sense, regulation 
prevents capitalism from destroying itself. As Marx put it in the context of 
the nineteenth century Factory Acts, which imposed limits on the working 
hours of factory operatives:
These Acts curb the passion of capital for a limitless draining of labour 
power, by forcibly limiting the working day by state regulations, made by 
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a state that is ruled by capitalist and landlord. Apart from the working class 
movement which daily grew more threatening, the limiting of factory 
labour was dictated by the same necessity which spread guano over the 
English fields. The same blind eagerness for plunder that had in one case 
exhausted the soil, had, in the other, torn up by the roots the living force 
of the nation.8
The factory owning class, Marx argued, was precipitating ‘the slow 
sacrifice of humanity’ in its ‘were-wolf hunger for surplus labour’.9 This 
passage of Capital captures the double movement that arises in struggles for 
regulatory standards. The first arises from class struggle from below. When 
we demand and campaign for ‘more’ regulation we do it because we know 
this can have real, material effects that mitigate the human costs of capitalism. 
We know that whether we campaign as trade unionists demanding higher 
safety standards in our workplace, or as communities demanding tighter 
limits on emissions from industrial sites in our neighbourhoods, that 
regulatory standards can save lives. Yet the paradox is that regulation also 
makes capitalism more durable. The outcome of a more carefully regulated 
system is that workers will continue to be injured and killed (albeit it at a 
lower rate) and communities will still be polluted (albeit not quite so badly). 
The second movement can be characterized as system preserving: as class 
struggle from above. Marx notes in the Grundrisse (in a passage dealing 
with the development of commodity markets) that capital cannot and 
does not recognize limits to expansion in the spheres of production and 
circulation. In the context of the expansion of global market, he notes that 
for capital, ‘[e]very limit appears as a barrier to be overcome’.10 He was 
not talking about the dynamic of regulatory law here, but nonetheless this 
is precisely the same dynamic that regulation confronts. Capital must be 
controlled because in its ‘blind eagerness’ it perceives no limits to its own 
insatiable urge to accumulate. States must impose limits on the conditions 
of accumulation, since capital has a dominant instinct in relation to law: to 
see regulatory limits merely as barriers to be overcome. Having said this, 
the representatives of capital themselves often recognize that regulation is 
in their long-term interest, even where the immediate impulse is to reject 
state intervention. The managers of large firms in particular are generally 
unwilling to subordinate themselves to the vagaries of the market.11 
Demands for ‘more regulation’ by the trade union movement and other 
social movements rarely contemplate the full implications of this double 
movement of class struggle. We rarely contemplate how our struggle 
for ‘more regulation’ or ‘more punishment’ from below might, in an 
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unintended sense, complement struggles for regulation from above. This 
means we rarely consider the struggle for regulation in more long term, 
strategic ways: how our struggles for regulation can enhance the prospect 
for social transformation. 
THE RISE OF THE CORPORATE CRIMINAL
The legal and administrative structures that emerge to regulate capital, 
whether in the financial market or the factory, can be understood as ‘unequal 
structures of representation’ that absorb and dissipate conflicts between 
opposing interests. Paraphrasing Antonio Gramsci, regulatory agencies 
are not simply ‘policemen’ – that is, their relation to capital is not merely 
one of opposition and externality – but they play a much more general 
role in reproducing the social conditions necessary to sustain unequal class 
relations.12 
The end of the nineteenth century saw the proliferation of forms of 
regulation aimed at social protection (food standards, pollution controls and 
so on) and rules to prevent the concentration of power in the economy 
across capitalist societies (anti-trust, banking regulation and so on).  The first 
Factory Acts, for example, carried a sliding scale of fines to be imposed on 
factory masters. However, as Carson’s history of the emergence of factory 
legislation shows, both the factories inspectors and the courts very quickly 
developed ways of ensuring those crimes went unpunished: the social power 
of the factory owners ensured that those crimes became ‘conventionalized’ 
and ‘routinized’ as normal business practice.13 The legal device that was 
developed (a different form of criminal liability known as ‘strict liability’) 
was ideally suited to the prosecution of the company, not merely the factory 
owner. Because for a strict liability offence the court does not need to 
establish individual fault, corporations rather than individuals could be found 
guilty of those factory crimes.14  
In the United Kingdom, the proportion of ‘companies’ (as opposed 
to real persons) prosecuted for breaches of the Factory Acts in the mid-
nineteenth century varied between 30 and 40 per cent.15 By the end of 
the nineteenth century, 50 per cent of prosecutions for such breaches were 
laid against corporate persons, rather than the factory masters themselves. 
Through the twentieth century although there has been an ongoing debate 
about the enforcement of the law against criminal individuals, illegal 
practices have generally been dealt with by imposing large fines against 
corporations in procedures that circumnavigate the courts. Indeed, towards 
the end of the twentieth century jurisdictions in Europe and in North 
America developed more explicit forms of corporate criminal liability. Fines 
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of several billion dollars levied on financial institutions for illegal practices 
are now commonplace in the US. And this practice is now spreading to 
European regulatory systems. In cases of environmental disasters and the 
killing of workers, it is generally the corporation that is prosecuted. In the 
case of breaches of safety law by employers against workers in the UK, for 
example, only around 3 per cent of prosecutions are laid against directors or 
senior managers; and it is normally only in the smallest companies that those 
individuals face punishment.16 
In the rare moments the state actively campaigns to prevent corporate 
crime, the object is the corporation. The punishment of the corporation is the 
principal mechanism through which the double movement of regulation 
is achieved. By punishing the corporation, the system can claim it is 
intervening to protect the workers, the community, and so on, whilst at 
the same time maintain the steady rate of production, consumption, and 
financial transactions. We can call this a principle of regulatory tolerance, 
whereby the system upholds regulatory standards whilst at the same time 
tolerating corporate offending. It is not an effective mode of regulation. A 
recent in-depth study of a wood particleboard manufacturing plant operated 
by Sonae in Kirkby in the northwest of England illustrates how this principle 
of regulatory tolerance can play out.17 Over a twelve-year period, the plant 
was prosecuted six times for offences against workers and the environment. 
The company was also the subject of constant safety inspections and formal 
notices issued by the two state regulators, the Health and Safety Executive 
and the Environment Agency. This did not appear to make any difference, as 
a litany of corporate offending culminated in the deaths of three workers in 
two separate incidents towards the end of this period, in 2010 and 2011. The 
remarkable feature of this case was that the corporation, Sonae, withstood 
an unprecedented level of prosecution and state intervention, and it did 
so without any interruption to or disruption of its accumulation of profit. 
It was effectively tolerated as a killer firm by the local and national states. 
Indeed, when the factory closed down in 2012, it was due to the global 
restructuring of the firm and declining global revenues, rather than anything 
the British criminal justice system had accomplished. 
The key issue that the principle of punishing the corporation raises is: why 
would punishing an abstract entity produce results? We are often told that the 
threat of reputational damage is the mechanism that can force corporations 
to comply. But this assumption fundamentally misjudges the balance of 
class forces at work here. Even if the corporation does suffer reputational 
damage, it still acts as a shield behind which the reputations of real people are 
masked. If executives occasionally appear in court, owners and shareholders 
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are rarely even identified in such cases. We are beginning to reveal how the 
system of punishment applied to corporate and white-collar offending has an 
intrinsically class character. To grasp the precise nature of the class character 
of regulation in this sphere, we need to explore a little more deeply how the 
corporation acts as a proxy for accumulation strategies. 
THE CORPORATE PERSON
The corporation was in many ways an ingenious invention for the property 
owning class.  One of the earliest recognized advantages of incorporation 
was that the entity would not die – it remained immortal – so did not 
pay death duties that would otherwise have been owed by an individual 
owner or investor’s estate.18  Similarly, if a ‘partner’ or ‘shareholder’ became 
bankrupt, the entity’s assets could not be used to pay the debts as the assets 
belonged to the entity rather than the individual shareholder. Thus, by 
creating a formally autonomous organization – a corporation – individuals 
could be protected from liability for any particular losses.   
Since at least the end of the nineteenth century, the corporation has been 
the key institutional mechanism though which surplus value is accrued 
and then re-distributed and re-invested in capitalist social orders. The 
‘corporation’ is always talked about as something that is abstracted from the 
real people and the real social relationships that make up the corporation: 
its managers, its owners, its workers, and so on. The corporation is thus 
abstracted from its core social purpose: the reproduction of class power 
through the accumulation of surplus value in the form of profits on behalf 
of its ‘owners’ or ‘shareholders’.  By virtue of its creation as an autonomous 
entity in law and in accounting practice, the corporation is able to claim 
that ‘it’, as a ‘corporate person’, is responsible and therefore liable for the 
consequences of ‘its’ actions.19 Thus executives and directors are almost always 
guaranteed immunity. For individual shareholders, the abstract edifice of the 
corporation offers much grander advantages. When the corporation formally 
becomes the owner of the corporation’s assets and the party responsible for 
the corporation’s’ liabilities, investors/shareholders in the corporation are thus 
able to ‘limit’ their liabilities to the value of the sum invested; the value of 
their ‘share’. Shareholders are generally not held responsible for the debts 
or other liabilities of the company, or for the costs of any legal proceedings 
that may arise from its activities.20 Corporate lawyers use the term ‘corporate 
veil’ to describe the protective shield that exists to protect the shareholders 
of the corporation from liability for the harms caused by the corporations.21 
Other advantages enjoyed by investors are granted by proxy ‘through’ 
the corporation. Not least of these advantages is that the corporate person is 
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for legal purposes regarded as the employer, rather than any flesh and blood 
person. Thus, the owners of the company are not held directly responsible 
for any liabilities that arise from the labour relationship. Nor do they have any 
obligation to know about, far less do anything about, the labour conditions 
faced by workers in the companies that they own. In complex chains of 
ownership, the autonomy granted to each unit in the chain as a separate 
and autonomous employer makes it easy for both individual shareholders 
and executives to avoid responsibility for their subsidiaries’ unfair labour 
practices or acts of employment discrimination. Supply chains and chains of 
ownership insulate primary owners and buyers from liability for violations 
of rights at the labour intensive end of the supply chain. The corporate veil 
in tort cases involving multinationals has, with a few scattered exceptions, 
prevented workers from seeking compensation.22 Corporate subsidies and 
corporate welfare constitute other key privileges that are granted to investors 
by proxy through the corporation.23  
We are often told that the corporation is given a central role in capitalist 
economies because it is an efficient producer of goods, employer of workers 
or provider of services. Yet when we consider that value accumulation 
is immeasurably enhanced by the series of privileges set out above, the 
corporation appears to be a wholly inefficient form of organization. All of 
the privileges and commercial advantages appear to accrue to the corporation 
itself (rather than its owners or shareholders). This is a deception largely 
because the corporation claims to benefit a range of stakeholders (workers, 
communities, customers) vicariously through the corporation. Yet if we 
consider the real social relationships encapsulated by the corporation, this 
is revealed as a sleight of hand. Those stakeholders (workers, communities, 
customers) actually generate value for the corporation, and therefore generate 
value for owners and shareholders.  Stakeholders do not extract value from 
the corporation (in the form or share dividends of the rising value of shares) 
as owners and shareholders are able to do.
Very simply, then, the corporation is a device that simultaneously allows 
exceptional privileges to be accrued by the property owning class and at the 
same time masks those privileges in a process of abstraction.24 The key point 
to grasp is that this process of abstraction is itself a process of regulation.
THE FAILURE OF ‘EXTERNAL REGULATION’
If we return to the example of the 2008 financial crisis, the regulatory 
issues at stake are not merely that the state failed to regulate new speculative 
derivative products, or that it failed to bring the biggest institutions into line. 
Much more than this, at every single turn, the state creates the conditions 
SOCIALIST REGISTER 20198
that permit particular forms of organization to accumulate profit in particular 
ways. From this perspective, regulation enabled the 2008 crash; it did not 
merely fail to prevent it. 
Demands for regulation fail to recognize the productive capacity the state 
uses to give life to the corporation: the complex of rules and infrastructure, 
and the laws and practices that give corporations the permission to act in 
particular ways. In other words, when we demand ‘more regulation’ be 
used to control corporations, we fail to recognize that the state is constantly 
regulating, and the corporation depends upon the minutiae of those rules 
and practices for its very existence. 
The productive capacities of state constitute a form of regulation in 
which the roles and the interests of state and capital are closely inter-woven. 
Corporations are given life in order to employ workers, to ‘trade’ in various 
forms of ‘market’ and to accumulate and distribute the profits that arise from 
its activities. Corporations are given life by the rules that govern labour 
and commodity markets, as well as by the laws that establish the social and 
economic obligations of corporations. In a productive sense, this regulatory 
framework in its entirety depends on the ongoing and ever-present 
integration of corporations into the economic and social fabric of the social 
order. The main legislative response in the UK to the 2008 crash was to 
ring fence ‘retail banking’ and ‘investment banking’. Without entering into 
a debate about the merits or failings of the measures that were introduced, 
this form of regulation can be said to be productive, because it sets the rules of 
entry into and the conditions of participation, in markets.25 
Yet public discussions about the regulation of corporations tends to view 
regulation only in a narrow controlling sense, whereby the relationship 
between the state and corporations or ‘business’ is one of externality – that is, 
the state stands as an institution or ensemble of institutions that are always 
seen in oppositional terms to capital. This logical turn allows the regulatory 
relationship to be represented as part of a heroic effort on the part of the state 
to control the excesses of capital. Even for the most progressive thinkers, 
adopting this external logic impulsively leads to a naïve demand for ‘more 
regulation’. Yet, no matter how hard the heroic state has sought to regulate 
in an external sense, it has not solved the problem of capital’s destructive 
tendencies. This is because the productive capacities of state regulation 
empower corporations to engage in socially destructive and harmful 
activities.26  
Corporations kill people, steal, defraud, and engage in deception on a scale 
that quite simply dwarfs the toll of the same crimes and harms committed 
by individuals. If such a claim might appear to be rather extreme to those 
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who have not reflected on or studied the problem of ‘corporate crime’, it is 
a claim that is convincingly supported by a wealth of empirical studies that 
reveal the ubiquity of corporate law breaking.27 In criminology today, the 
discipline that limits itself to studying ‘crime’, one would be hard-pushed 
to find any credible expert who would deny that corporate crime is an 
endemic and systematic feature of contemporary capitalist societies. Cases 
such as the Volkswagen emissions scandal revealed routine law breaking in 
the company going back to the 1980s – not only on the part of one German 
manufacturer, but also on the part of a very large number of household name 
automobile companies.28  The routine nature of law breaking is revealed in 
detailed case studies across jurisdictions and across industrial sectors.29 The 
point is that the toll of this offending is beyond the capacity of any criminal 
justice system. We simply do not have the resources to control a problem 
that is as endemic and everyday as corporate offending is.
Surveillance and prosecution aimed at controlling the crimes committed 
by corporations is dealt with by specialist agencies that are not given the 
same political priority as police forces. Different categories of law have been 
developed to ensure such crimes are regarded in the courts, and a wider 
cultural sense, as being less serious than other forms of theft or violence. 
In the neoliberal period, even token levels of inspection and enforcement 
in relation to corporate crime have been sharply eroded. British workers, 
for example, can expect a workplace safety inspector to call less than once 
every 50 years. Even when serious offences are investigated, the chance of a 
prosecution is negligible.30
The oil major BP presents a particularly stark example of how little 
even the largest fines can matter to refocusing executive decision-making. 
BP’s Deepwater Horizon catastrophe in 2010 came after a series of very 
serious offences, including an explosion that killed 15 workers in their Texas 
refinery in 2005 (which led to a record $50.6 million fine), and a series of oil 
spills in Alaska in 2006 (which led to a $25 million fine). At a grand total of 
$65 billion, the compensation ordered by the courts for Deepwater Horizon 
dwarfed those earlier fines. Yet those fines failed to make any difference 
to BP’s profit over safety approach to management. The earlier fines 
represented a very small fraction of BP’s annual revenue. The Texas refinery 
fine represented 0.017 per cent of the BP Group’s revenue for 2010, the 
year the fine was levied, and the Alaska fine amounted to around 0.007 per 
cent of the group’s revenue for 2011, the year that the fine was levied. The 
bill for Deepwater Horizon has, as the financial press have enthusiastically 
noted, been absorbed largely by the recent sharp rise in oil prices.31
 The fines imposed on corporations for breaching financial rules are 
SOCIALIST REGISTER 201910
generally much higher relative to those for offences related to worker safety 
or environmental offending, and are rising. Yet, the huge fines imposed on 
them for designing the financial products that precipitated the crisis has not 
even dented their ability to accumulate.32  When the largest part of the fine 
against RBS noted in the introduction to this essay was confirmed, Chief 
Executive Ross McEwan announced ‘[o]ur current shareholders will be 
very pleased this deal is done’. Indeed, on the day the fine was announced, 
RBS shares rose 5.5 per cent  in early trading, and later traded nearly 3 per 
cent higher for the day.33
Of course, large fines may have an impact upon the reputation of the 
company, and the fines may dent profits. Yet because fines are generally 
levied on the ‘corporation’, rather than targeted at a particular group within 
it, the cost burden of even the largest fine can be absorbed and redistributed; 
those costs might be offset against a particular budget heading (they might 
result in cuts to wages or other operational costs), or they may be passed 
onto customers and clients in the form of price rises, or onto suppliers by 
reducing the market value of a product.  Fines for violating safety laws and 
causing fatalities in the workplace may be absorbed by workers in the form 
of wage cuts and downsizing.34
Fines imposed on companies, for all of the reasons outlined here, have 
little more effect than perpetuating a structure of power that is ultimately 
designed to shield class interests. Little wonder then that studies on the 
impact of pecuniary penalties on the corporation generally find little 
correlation between the imposition of fines and a deterrent effect.35 External 
regulation thus fails on its own terms; it does not solve the problem it sets 
out to solve, precisely because it confronts the immense social power of 
corporations. By focusing predominantly on the corporation, external 
regulation simply reproduces the reification of the corporation as the problem, 
rather than problematizing the class that stands behind it.36 In such contexts, 
the state does not look particularly punitive. Thus, when we limit our 
demands for regulation to the representatives of capital (executives) and to 
the corporation itself, we are unlikely to achieve accountability, or to provide 
a basis for progressive social change. This raises a fundamental question: 
can this seemingly endless cycle of corporate crime be broken if we could 
target regulatory intervention more effectively? Are there ways to punish 
corporate and white-collar crime that can limit capital’s ‘werewolf’ hunger?
A MODEST PROPOSAL
When we contemplate the full force of capital’s capacity for social destruction, 
external forms of regulation as a panacea quickly appear redundant. This is 
obvious when we consider the role regulation has played in a wider sense, in 
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enabling the most harmful consequences of industrial development. When 
we regulate corporations, even in the moment that the state appears to 
be punitive, class interests are ultimately protected in ways that are often 
counterintuitive.  Therefore, if we are to demand ‘more regulation’ and 
‘more prosecution’ in the aftermath of capitalism’s crises, then we need to be 
sure that we are not merely strengthening the institutional forms of power 
that created the crisis in the first place. 
What, then, are the forms of regulatory response that we might propose 
in the aftermath of a crisis such as the 2008 crash (i.e. beyond a few 
prosecutions?). A significant radical demand has been that we should simply 
nationalize the banks. Indeed, in some jurisdictions this is effectively what 
happened. Yet the model of nationalization in most places where there 
was a bailout, was structured to protect the largest investors. As part of the 
bailout deal, the British government wholly acquired RBS, for example. 
This ownership has not altered the management of the bank substantially, 
and indeed the government has been ensuring its liquidity until the point it 
will be handed back to private investors at a net loss to taxpayers estimated 
at £26 billion.37  The general principle of the bailout was to reinforce the 
controlling class interests in banking and finance. 
Our argument as socialists should be that regulatory intervention that is 
aimed at finding a lasting solution to the crisis must ensure that the power 
structure that produced the crisis is not protected or strengthened. Otherwise, 
we will simply be reproducing the conditions that created the crisis in the 
first place. The punishment following the 2008 crash should therefore have 
been focused on weakening the class interests that stand behind the banking 
corporations. 
One of the more radical strands of argument in the research dealing with 
corporate crime is a resurgence of the idea of the ‘corporate death penalty’. 
It may seem like an extreme measure, and one that is a utopian aim, but 
this option is actually currently available to courts in a large number of 
jurisdictions that carry unlimited fines for serious corporate offences. A 
large enough fine can immediately divest a corporation of all of its assets, 
thus effectively putting it into liquidation.38 A second scenario in which 
the corporate death penalty can be applied, though also rare, is when civil 
damages are imposed at a level which has the same effect. Ramirez and 
Ramirez propose that a version of ‘three strikes and you’re out’, notoriously 
used by the US and other states from the 1980s onwards to deal with relatively 
low-level offending, could apply to corporations.39 Instead of going to jail, 
the ‘out’ would be that the corporation would be ‘put to death’, or put into 
liquidation by the courts. 
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Yet in Ramirez and Ramirez’s version of the corporate death penalty, 
justice is class-blind. When a company is forced into liquidation by the 
courts, of course the outcome is not class-neutral. Shareholders are likely to 
lose their investment. However, because of limited liability, the fall out for 
them stops at this point. Other creditors risk losing much more. This counts 
especially for workers who generally not only lose their livelihoods, but risk 
losing their pension, health care plans, and in some cases may suffer a series 
of knock-on effects (they may lose their home, in private education systems 
be unable to contribute to their children’s education, and so on). Moreover, 
the wider community loses out if there are a large number of job losses. The 
corporate death penalty, therefore, may have exactly the same effect as large 
fines have: they may make victims of the most vulnerable. We therefore 
need to think about how to respond to such crises so as not to punish the 
most vulnerable by proxy through the corporation; punishments that do not 
simply shore up the class interests standing behind the corporation. 
If the corporate death penalty is targeted not merely at ‘killing’ the abstract 
corporation, but is targeted at ending all existing class privileges and rights, 
senior executives, managers, and shareholders40 could all be forced to forfeit 
their rights as they are inscribed in the corporation. If we are saving jobs, or 
maintaining a particular service in the community, we need a corporate death 
penalty to trigger forms of ownership that are both equitable and sustainable, 
such as democratic public ownership, or worker-led cooperatives. Of course, 
the ownership model would need to depend on the scale and nature of the 
enterprise. It is more feasible for example to envisage a chipboard factory 
to be solely worker-owned rather than a major bank. The bank might be 
forced into a democratic form of public ownership. 
The point is that persistent behaviour on the part of the corporation can 
be taken as reason to forfeit the right to ownership and profit. After all, 
this is the logic that the criminal justice system applies to other forms of 
commercial criminals in the illicit markets. Drug dealers and fraudsters have 
their funds and assets sequestrated by the courts routinely. All we are doing 
here is applying the same logic.
We already have a developed methodology that, in theory at least, could 
be applied for this purpose. There is an important but little-known body 
of research that develops the concept of equity fines.41 The basic idea of 
equity fines is that shareholders are forced to absorb punitive costs when 
the corporate activities they profit from break the law through the re-
socialisation of part of the corporation. Equity fines reclaim value directly 
from shareholders through a process of share dilution.42 The courts, or the 
administrative authority in this proposal, order the issue of a new batch of 
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shares worth a proportion of the corporation’s existing equity. The shares 
could then be controlled by a defined set of fund-holders. The fund could 
be controlled by a state-appointed body, a collective of workers, or the 
local community. In cases where this is warranted, full ownership of the 
corporation could be transferred. Thus, we can envisage a form of the 
corporate death penalty in which what ‘death’ really means is the forfeiture 
of class entitlements. After this ‘death’, the corporation can be-reborn under 
new democratic forms of ownership.
CHALLENGING THE CLASS POWER BEHIND THE 
CORPORATION
Thinking through proposals such as this is a utopian exercise. I am certainly 
not claiming in this essay that the refined approaches to the punishment 
of corporate and white collar crime outlined above alone can transform 
the system. Moreover, there are a series of broader problems involved 
in conceptualizing a new ownership structure: should a new form of 
organization also enjoy corporate personhood, limited liability, and all the 
other attendant privileges; what use is a new form of common ownership 
if it is still conditioned by capitalist market forces? Having said this, the 
logical development of this argument for a corporate death penalty raises 
important questions about how, ultimately, a transformative strategy needs 
to involve a wholesale removal of the rights and privileges of corporate 
owners and shareholders.    Such proposals need to be worked through in 
a strategic, rather than a merely tactical, approach43 precisely because they 
address the material conditions of the social relationships that are abstracted 
by the corporation. These strategies can therefore only be a starting point 
in thinking through how regulatory demands and struggles can attack the 
source of corporate power in meaningful ways. Once we recognize the class 
character of how regulation works through the corporation, then we can 
be more clearly focused on struggles that meaningfully challenge the class 
power that stands behind the corporation. 
Of course, we cannot abandon struggles that reinforce and restore social 
protections. After all, workers and other social groups had, and still have, a 
more immediate set of concerns about regulation: how can the law protect us 
from being killed at work?  How can the law ensure our food doesn’t poison 
us, or ensure that our communities are not exposed to toxic emissions? We 
cannot ignore the huge advances in the living conditions of ordinary people 
in the nations that have been forced to develop systems of social regulation. 
Neither can we fail to recognize that social regulation has been so easily 
dismantled in the neoliberal period. 
SOCIALIST REGISTER 201914
Let us put it this way: if the corporation did not exist, and we were 
asked to create a form of institution that would accelerate inequality, hasten 
the global dominance of neoliberal capitalism, embed the financialization 
of social relations in everyday life, and produce climate change and other 
critical ecological crises, then we would be hard pressed to find a better 
design. It is time to turn our attention to how we can accelerate the end of 
the corporation and the class privileges that stand behind it. 
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